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In 2011, riots occurred in 10 British cities following the 
killing of Mark Duggan, a black man, by the Metropolitan 
Police. In the wake of the riots, there were reviews into 
the treatment of black, Asian and ethnic minority (BAME) 
individuals in the criminal justice system (Lammy 2017) 
and into how the police dealt with rioters (HMIC 2011; 
NatCen 2011). However, no significant changes to the 
criminal justice system (CJS) were made.1
In May 2020, the death of George Floyd during an arrest 
in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA, reignited demands 
concerning racial injustice in the US which have shone a 
harsh light on the work of the police, leading to demands 
to ‘defund’ and demilitarize policing. Unlike the riots in 
Britain, however, public demands to address institutional 
racism in US policing have ignited an international debate 
regarding structural racism and policing.
Because the work of the police, the courts and prisons 
are interlinked in the UK, critical questions need to be 
asked of the entire CJS, not just the police (regardless of 
discriminatory ‘stop and search’ policies in the UK, where 
the latest government statistics show that there were four 
stop and searches for every 1,000 white people, compared 
to 38 for every 1,000 black people – see UK Government 
2020).2 ‘Justice’, says Nader (2009), is a highly ambiguous 
word. It serves both as an ideology that promotes equality 
and also takes its character from wider society: an unjust 
and iniquitous society necessarily gives rise to controlling 
legal processes, which reinforces injustice and inequality 
and sustains the status quo. Nader urges us to examine the 
nature and experience of ‘injustice’ to identify common 
ground to better the human condition.
In London, a large percentage of the population exist 
precariously – which is to say that there are growing num-
bers of people whose lives are affected by ‘unstable labor, 
low and unstable incomes and loss of citizenship rights’ 
(Standing 2018: 2). This growing social class is character-
ized by poverty and homelessness and, while a large per-
centage come from BAME groups, it also includes sizeable 
numbers of white people. This socially heterogenous class 
is the new ‘dangerous class’ and has been created by neo-
liberal reforms (Wacquant 2012), the crisis in the welfare 
state (Koch 2018; Taylor-Goodby 2013), de-industrializa-
tion and the creation of a global economy. It is this class of 
people who bear the brunt of policing.
The purpose of magistrates’ courts is to provide ‘fast 
and effective’ ‘summary justice’ with the objective of pro-
ducing ‘the best justice at a reasonable cost and within an 
acceptable timescale’ (Gibson & Gordon 2008: 14). A dif-
ferent way of putting it is that magistrates’ courts dispense 
relatively quick and cheap justice for offenders who do not 
have the right to a trial, compared to Crown courts which 
deal with serious offences and adopt greater procedural 
safeguards to ensure that ‘justice’ is done (Carlen 1976).
Anthropologists have done very little research on 
summary justice/magistrates’ courts in the UK or on the 
intersection between race, socio-economic precarity and 
justice. In 2016-2017, I undertook ethnographic research 
in 13 magistrates’ courts across metropolitan London, with 
the intention of understanding how magistrates’ courts – 
which process 94 per cent of all criminal offences – deal 
with ‘minor’ offences (See Fig. 1).
Magistrates’ courts hear indictable and either-way 
offences – the former are serious offences which should 
normally be referred to a Crown court for trial, whereas 
the latter can be tried by magistrates – and a range of ‘sum-
mary’ offences, including public order offences, domestic 
violence, drug and fraud offences and motoring offences.
Official statistics reveal the reach and impact of these 
courts. In 2019, approximately 1.34 million offences were 
tried in magistrates’ courts across England and Wales. 
Approximately 84 per cent of defendants in magistrates’ 
courts and 84 per cent in Crown courts were found guilty 
and convicted.3 Between 2012 and 2016, magistrates in 
London heard on average 222,000 offences a year, of which 
just under 2 per cent were for indictable-only offences, 21 
per cent were for triable either-way offences, 43 per cent 
were for summary non-motoring offences and 33 per cent 
were for summary motoring offences.4 ‘Summary justice’ 
– hearings that are conducted in proceedings which are 
carried out rapidly by omitting legal formalities required 
by the common law – offers defendants a limited oppor-
tunity to defend themselves: about 70 per cent of defend-
ants plead guilty and are immediately sentenced without 
going to trial, and 85 per cent of individuals who plead ‘not 
guilty’ and elect to be tried by magistrates are convicted.
While there are many questions which should be raised 
about summary justice – including why most defendants 
plead guilty and what the contribution of legal counsel is 
in proceedings where the majority of defendants are found 
guilty (see Campbell, in press) – in this article, I look at 
some of the key aspects of injustice experienced by adults 
(I did not have access to juvenile courts). Before discussing 
my research findings, it is important to note that I observed 
238 remand hearings and 23 criminal trials. In addition to 
making an ethnographic record of each hearing/trial to 
record case details, I also studied the work of the police, 
Crown prosecutors, magistrates and district judges, legal 
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Fig. 1.  Criminal Offences
Indictable only
Murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery and serious fraud 
cases can only be heard at a Crown court.
Triable either way
These can be dealt with either by magistrates or before 
a judge and jury at the Crown court. These offences in-
clude theft, handling stolen goods, fraud, drug offences, 
domestic violence, sexual assaults on a minor, carrying 
a concealed/bladed weapon, assault on a police officer, 
GBH (grievous bodily harm) etc. A defendant can insist 
on their right to trial in the Crown court. Magistrates 
can also decide that a case is so serious that it should 
be dealt with in the Crown court – which can impose 
tougher sentences if the defendant is found guilty. The 
maximum punishment for a single summary offence is 
six months in prison and/or a fine of up to £5,000.
Summary non-motoring
Minor assaults, theft, shoplifting, possession of drugs, 
public order offences, drink driving, threatening and 
abusive behaviour, racially aggravated assault, travelling 
on public transport without a ticket, begging, breach of 
bail, indecent exposure, fleeing arrest etc.
Summary motoring
Motoring offences: causing injury, causing death, 
dangerous driving, driving under the influence, failing 
to supply the identity of the driver, other motoring of-
fences, vehicle insurance offences, speed limit offences 
(not theft of vehicles).
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for minor crimes. You have to 
admit an offence and agree to be 
cautioned. You can be arrested 
and charged if you don’t agree. 
A caution is not a criminal 
conviction, but it could be used 
as evidence of bad character 
if you go to court for another 
crime. The number of ‘out of 
court disposals’ has declined 
from nearly 600,000 a year in 
2008 to just over 200,000 in 
2018 (Ministry of Justice 2019: 
11).
8. For an overview of how 
the police are supposed to 
investigate offences, see the 
training manual used by the 
College of Policing at: https://
www.app.college.police.uk/
app-content/investigations/
investigation-process/. 
However, as my book (in press) 
documents, the police fail to 
follow these steps when they 
investigate domestic violence 
and other types of crime.
9. Reply to FOI Request 7679 
dated 30 April 2018 from the 
CPS.
10. The population census, 
which asks individuals how 
they self-identify, provides 
a more detailed picture of 
ethnicity in London than I 
am able to provide regarding 
the ethnicity of defendants. I 
have data on the ethnicity of 
defendants in 172 of the 238 
remand hearings I observed.
11. This includes individuals 
of indeterminate ethnicity who 
would probably self-identify as 
‘White’, e.g. Scottish, Welsh, 
Romani, Irish and Italian (the 
same category was used in the 
2011 UK Census).
12. For a good overview of 
the situation, see: https://www.
instituteforgovernment.org.
uk/publication/performance-
tracker-2019/criminal-courts.
13. In May 2019, the 
government began to 
‘renationalize the supervision 
of criminals after a botched 
part-privatization programme 
was found to be putting the 
public at risk. The Transforming 
Rehabilitation programme 
aimed to reduce reoffending and 
save money, but the government 
was forced to bail out failing 
companies and cancel contracts 
early in moves expected to cost 
taxpayers more than £467m’.
The transformation was due to 
be complete by May 2021 (See 
Dearden 2019).
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advisers, defence lawyers and the probation officers who 
appeared in court. From my observations, I created a quan-
titative database which recorded data on 58 elements of 
each hearing/trial. The database included information on 
the sex, gender, age and race of defendants, details of the 
alleged crime, the evidence relied upon, the magistrate’s 
decision, whether a defendant was found ‘guilty’ or ‘not 
guilty’ (and if guilty, whether s/he was imprisoned, fined, 
subjected to an order or a ban etc.), evidence on the mental 
health and ‘poverty’ of defendants, whether defendants 
were legally represented and whether they pleaded guilty 
without their case going to trial.
I found that the majority of remand hearings were con-
cluded in less than 20 minutes (hearings varied from 4 
to 45 minutes). Criminal trials were concluded between 
50 minutes to three hours; surprisingly, of the 23 trials I 
observed, in only seven cases was the defendant found 
guilty. For the remaining cases: in two, the defendants 
were found not guilty; four trials were ‘vacated’;5 three 
were adjourned, two were transformed into case manage-
ment meetings; three individuals were convicted in their 
absence and two cases were adjourned when the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) failed to disclose its evidence. 
In short, the majority of trials I observed did not result in 
a conviction. 
A speedy hearing is required by law and is expedited by 
a number of factors. First, while the police may charge the 
majority of suspects with an offence, they fail to investi-
gate a large percentage of offences6 and they may issue a 
‘caution’,7 which diverts many suspects out of the criminal 
justice system.8 Indeed, it is rare for independent evidence 
of a crime to be submitted to the court. Furthermore, the 
police appear to focus their efforts on cases which are 
easy to prove, e.g. via an admission of guilt or because the 
defendant was arrested in possession of drugs (often as a 
result of ‘stop and search’ operations).
Second, the CPS prosecutes the cases which the police 
want prosecuted in part because it lacks the power to inves-
tigate cases. As Sanders (2016: 3) has argued, ‘the case 
files sent by police to prosecutors are not neutral compila-
tions of relevant facts, but constructions that aim to secure 
convictions’. Given the imbalance in power between the 
police and the CPS, it is little wonder that prosecutors 
rarely drop cases that may be evidentially weak. Indeed, a 
Freedom of Information request to the CPS9 revealed that 
it consistently fails to prosecute a large number of offences 
(see Fig. 2).
Third, magistrates – who receive little formal training 
– and district judges are not representative of the commu-
nities they serve: over half of all magistrates are women; 
about 12 per cent declared themselves as BAME; about 5 
per cent were under 40 years old, whereas 52 per cent were 
60 or over (Lord Chief Justice 2019). Furthermore, the 
judiciary rarely challenge police evidence and they rely on 
procedural rules and convoluted statutory ‘legal language’ 
– which the majority of appellants do not understand – to 
speedily hear a case.
The effect of the above factors means that in 46 per cent 
of the cases I observed, defendants pleaded ‘guilty’ when 
they were initially arraigned and were immediately sen-
tenced (in 46 per cent of cases defendants pleaded ‘not 
guilty’ and their case went to trial, and in 9 per cent of cases 
there was another outcome). While it is clear that many 
defendants had committed a crime, it was also the case that 
other factors influenced their pleas. For instance, in a legal 
system where government legal aid is available to pay law-
yers to represent defendants, it was noticeable that in 28 per 
cent of the remand cases I observed, the defendant was not 
legally represented. This situation raises serious problems 
given the speed of the proceedings, the court’s reliance on 
legal language and the inability of unrepresented defend-
ants to challenge police evidence. Furthermore, lawyers 
paid by legal aid often did little more than assist the court 
by providing information about their clients; they did not 
appear to have adequately prepared their cases, they failed 
to challenge police evidence and overall, they provided a 
poor defence for their clients.
For a variety of reasons, it is not possible to know 
whether there is a causal link between a conviction and 
the absence of legal representation because there are too 
many factors which may affect the outcome of a hearing, 
including the type and nature of evidence relied upon by 
the police and possible admissions and/or pressures placed 
on offenders by the police in ‘pre-trial procedures’ (e.g. 
during interrogation, solicitor-client interviews and in plea 
or charge bargaining – see Sanders et al. 2020).
Nevertheless, a number of conclusions clearly emerge 
from my research. Individuals from BAME communities 
form a disproportionately high percentage of the defend-
ants in the CJS compared to their proportion in the general 
population as Fig. 3 shows.10
Furthermore, it is not the case, as some have suggested, 
that individuals from BAME communities plead ‘guilty’ 
because they lack legal advice/representation. My data 
indicates that individuals of all ethnicities had equal access 
to a lawyer (roughly 82 per cent of black people, 85 per 
cent of Asians and 81 per cent of whites were legally rep-
resented). The problem at this stage of the CJS is not a 
lack of legal representation, but its ineffectiveness. In the 
cases I observed, lawyers, especially those paid by legal 
aid, appeared to do little more than process their clients 
through the CJS.
In addition, few steps are taken by the police, the court 
or lawyers to protect the rights of potentially ‘vulnerable’ 
defendants. My observations were clear: individuals with 
mental health problems and who were illiterate were not 
helped to understand the consequences of a guilty plea; 
such individuals were required to plead and were usu-
ally convicted. For instance, in at least 11 per cent of 
remand hearings, the defendant was mentally ill – they 
exhibited aberrant behaviour and/or were held in mental 
health facilities – yet legal proceedings continued, often 
in their absence. There are, therefore, serious questions 
about whether many defendants were competent to stand 
trial (‘vulnerable’ defendants should have had their cases 
diverted out of the court).
To return to the intersection between race and criminal 
justice, 50 per cent of the defendants I observed came 
from BAME communities, 24 per cent were under the age 
of 21 and 48 per cent of defendants were ‘poor’ (defined 
in terms of being homeless/sleeping rough, owing the 
court money for previous convictions or because court 
fines were deducted from the defendant’s state benefits). 
Fig. 2. Discontinued and dropped prosecutions by the CPS 
in magistrates’ courts, youth courts and Crown courts, 2014 
to 2017
London England & Wales
Dis- 
continued
Dropped Dis- 
continued
Dropped
2014 3,673 13,307 25,378 71,612
2015 3,979 13,690 21,891 66,830
2016 4,533 14,366 17,942 58,644
2017 4,136 12,154 15,552 50,296
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Frequently ethnicity, poor mental health, substance abuse 
and poverty overlap and result in a ‘guilty’ plea and imme-
diate sentencing.
For the above reasons, demands to eliminate structural 
racism in the police will not be effective without consid-
ering how the entire criminal justice system works. While 
it is certainly the case that the police arrest dispropor-
tionate numbers of individuals from BAME communities, 
the evidence from the courts shows that the ‘precariat’ – 
who are not necessarily from minority communities but 
may also be poor, homeless, lack employment and experi-
ence mental illness and substance abuse – are targeted by 
the police. Indeed, nearly all of those who are arrested for 
minor criminal offences are processed in lockstep by the 
CJS and are convicted.
Though the CJS is undergoing a severe financial squeeze 
– indicated by huge cuts in public funding for the police 
and courts, the closure of large numbers of courts, a sharp 
decline in the number of magistrates etc. – additional 
funding alone will not redress current injustices.12 On the 
basis of my research, research on ‘stop and search’ policing 
(e.g. Tiratelli et al. 2018) and fundamental questions about 
the quality of justice raised by the ‘Black Lives Matter’ pro-
tests, it appears that the entire CJS needs to be restructured 
and the role played by state institutions should be reconsid-
ered, beginning with redefining the primary purpose and 
responsibilities of the police (a task often called for, but yet 
to be realized – see House of Commons 2007/8). 
In addition, the relation between the police and the 
CPS needs to be redefined with, on the one hand the CPS 
being granted more power to oversee police arrests and 
prosecutions and, on the other, the CPS becoming pub-
licly accountable. Magistrates and district judges require 
much better legal training; as a general rule, they should 
ensure that police evidence is challenged and that defend-
ants understand the offence they are being charged with. 
Furthermore, defence lawyers need much better training 
and must have adequate access to their clients to prepare 
the case in advance of the hearing.
Finally, probation services not only need to be brought 
back into the public sector, they also need to be reor-
ganized and better funded to allow them and the prison 
service to provide offenders/prisoners with assistance in 
dealing with drug addiction, substance abuse and mental 
ill health which can cause repeat offending.13 In short, 
what is needed is a shift in thinking about the role of the 
CJS away from the controlling ideas of our times – such 
as ‘justice’ and mass incarceration – to broader concerns 
about ‘fairness’ of treatment, which can be reinforced by 
an educational system which helps us to understand our 
legal/human rights and which provides us with the requi-
site skills and knowledge to enable us to better succeed in 
life, thereby reducing social inequality. l
Fig. 4 Westminster 
Magistrates’ Court.
Fig. 5. City of London 
Magistrates’ Court.
Fig. 3. Ethnicity in London and among defendants
Ethnicity in London 
(2011 Census)
Ethnicity of 
defendants in 
my study
Asian 18.5 % 24 %
Black 13.3 % 26 %
Mixed & other 8.4 % 1 %
White 44.9%
47 %
Other White11 14.9
Total 100 % 98 %
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